The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court’s June 17, 2026 decision in Misingwa Land Trust v. Board of Commissioners of Beaver County et al. (Nos. 944 and 1162-69 C.D. 2023) may influence a broader view of what qualifies as a “purely public charity” under Pennsylvania law, particularly for environmental and conservation organizations.
This matter concerns the Trust’s request for a real estate tax exemption for approximately 412 acres of preserved land in Beaver County, Pennsylvania based on its purported qualification as a “purely public charity” within the meaning of Article VIII, Section 2(a)(v) of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
To qualify for a real estate tax exemption in Pennsylvania, an organization must first establish that it is a “purely public charity” under Article VIII, Section 2(a)(v) of the Pennsylvania Constitution by satisfying the five-factor test articulated in in Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306, 1317 (Pa. 1985) (the “HUP Test”), and then also satisfy the Institutions of Purely Public Charities Act, also known as Act 55. Alliance Home of Carlisle, PA v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 919 A.2d 206, 222 (Pa. 2007). Under the HUP test, an organization must: (1) advance a charitable purpose; (2) donate or render gratuitously a substantial portion of its services; (3) benefit a substantial and indefinite class of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity; (4) relieve the government of some of its burden; and (5) operate entirely free from a private profit motive. 487 A.2d at 1317.
The Trust was originally formed to protect land of ecological, historical, and cultural significance, including areas associated with the Adena, Hopewell, and Eastern Woodlands people. In 2022, the Board of Assessment denied the Trust’s petitions for an exemption. According to MLT, the property is maintained for conservation, environmental remediation, and public enjoyment without an admissions fee, and thus qualifies for a tax exemption. On appeal, the Court of Common Pleas affirmed the Board of Assessment, holding that the Trust had not established that it donates a substantial portion of its services and operates entirely free of profit motive. The trial court concluded that MLT satisfied two of the five HUP factors by demonstrating that it donates or renders gratuitously a substantial portion of its services and operates entirely free from a private profit motive. However, it concluded that the MLT failed to establish the three remaining factors: that it advances a charitable purpose, benefits a substantial and indefinite class of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity, and relieves the government of some of its burden. In reaching that conclusion, the trial court reasoned that the property functioned more like a private park than a public charitable resource, citing the lack of evidence that the public actually used the property or was aware that it was publicly accessible. The trial court also concluded that MLT’s conservation and maintenance activities did not sufficiently relieve governmental responsibilities, at least in part because when MLT discovered toxins on the property, it turned the matter over to the government. Because the trial court determined that MLT failed to satisfy the constitutional HUP test, no decision was reached in the separate statutory analysis under Act 55. Misingwa Land Trust v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Beaver Cnty., Nos. 944 & 1162–69 C.D. 2023, 2026 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 101, at *16 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 17, 2026).
The Trust appealed to the Commonwealth Court on August 28, 2023. The Commonwealth Court concluded that the trial court’s interpretation of the HUP test was overly narrow.[1] As part of the HUP test, MLT had to show that it “advance[d] a charitable purpose.” The court found guidance on the meaning of “charitable purpose” in the Solicitation of Fund for Charitable Purposes Act (“Charitable Purposes Act”), which defined “charitable purpose” as including “environmental conservation” objectives. 10 P.S. § 162.3. The court also emphasized that the trial court’s analysis overlooked a key aspect of the trust’s mission: environmental preservation.
On remand as to the “charitable purpose” prong of the HUP test, the Commonwealth Court directed the trial court to consider the trust’s conservation and remediation efforts, as well as the public values reflected in the History Code (37 Pa. C.S. §§101-906.), the Charitable Purposes Act, and Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment, Article I, Section 27:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
Finding that the trial court failed to consider any of the aforementioned laws in its analysis, and finding that the trial court “effectively eliminated the charitable purpose factor” by merging it with another HUP factor, the Commonwealth Court expressly rejected the trial court’s conclusion that “the Land Trust does not advance a charitable purpose for the stated reason that it did not satisfy a separate factor in the HUP test.” MLT, 2026 Pa. Commw. LEXIS at *21-22.
Further, the Commonwealth Court took issue with the trial court’s analysis under the HUP test of whether MLT’s assumption of responsibility for maintaining green space relieved a governmental burden. The Commonwealth Court noted that “government has long provided support for public parks and recreation areas as well as for cultural institutions . . . .” MLT, 2026 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 101, at *33 (quoting Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist. v. Chester Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 714 A.2d 397, 401 (Pa. 1998) (“Appeal of Longwood Gardens”)). The Environmental Rights Amendment requires the government to conserve and maintain public natural resources, further reinforcing MLT’s relief of public burden. PA. CONST. art. I, §27. And the protection of “scenic areas for public visual enjoyment” is a recognized government function. Section 5(a)(5) of the Open Space Lands Act, 32 P.S. §5005(a)(5). Accordingly, the Trust’s maintenance of the open space at issue relieved Beaver County of its burden to do so, and the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.
The opinion reflects a growing recognition that environmental stewardship itself can constitute a charitable purpose. Pennsylvania courts have long acknowledged that preservation of land for public educational, historical, and aesthetic purposes may support tax exemption. See, e.g., Appeal of Longwood Gardens, 87 A.2d 262 (Pa. 1952). By directing the trial court to consider the trust’s conservation activities, the Commonwealth Court reaffirmed the extension of that principle to environmental preservation efforts.
In addition, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the Trust’s conservation efforts relieve the government of some of its burden. The court’s reasoning recognizes that preserving environmentally and culturally significant land, maintaining open space, and remediating natural resources further governmental objectives that have long been supported by the Commonwealth.
While MLT remains on remand, the Commonwealth Court’s decision reflects an important development in Pennsylvania charitable tax exemption law’s application to environmental conservation organizations. Private environmental preservation is increasingly being viewed not merely as private conservation activity, but as a public benefit that satisfies the “charitable purpose” requirements for tax exemption. If adopted by future courts, this approach could increase exemption opportunities for land trusts and other conservation-focused organizations across Pennsylvania.
[1] The Commonwealth Court took issue with several different pieces of the trial court’s decision. This article focuses solely on the environmental aspects of the opinion and not the Commonwealth Court’s opinion as to whether MLT provides “benefit to a substantial and indefinite class of persons.”